Sumber: NBER.org
We construct an endogenous growth model that includes a cultural variable along the dimension of individualism-collectivism. The model predicts that more individualism leads to more innovation because of the social rewards associated with innovation in an individualist culture. This cultural effect may offset the negative effects of bad institutions on growth.
Collectivism leads to efficiency gains relative to individualism, but these gains are static, unlike the dynamic effect of individualism on growth through innovation.
Using genetic data as instruments for culture we provide strong evidence of a causal effect of individualism on income per worker and total factor productivity as well as on innovation.
The baseline genetic markers we use are interpreted as proxies for cultural transmission but others have a direct effect on individualism and collectivism, in line with recent advances in biology and neuro-science.
The effect of culture on long-run growth remains very robust even after controlling for the effect of institutions and other factors. We also provide evidence of a two-way causal effect between culture and institutions.
Download: Culture, Institutions and the Wealth of Nations, oleh Yuriy Gorodnichenko dan Gerard Roland
Sumber: NBER.org
This paper discusses the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation (TCR), a framework to analyze the interaction between governments and investors fundamentally, but not exclusively, in utility industries.
TCR sees regulation as the governance structure of these interactions, and thus, as in standard transaction cost economics, it places emphasis in understanding the nature of the hazards inherent to these interactions.
The emphasis on transactional hazards requires a microanalytical perspective, where performance assessment is undertaken within the realm of possible institutional alternative. In that sense, politics becomes fundamental to understanding regulation as the governance of public / private interactions.
The paper discusses two fundamental hazards and their organizational implications: governmental and third party opportunism. Both interact to make regulatory processes and outcomes more rigid, formalistic, and prone to conflict than envisioned by relational contracting.
Download: Transaction Cost Regulation, oleh Pablo T. Spiller.
Sumber: NBER.org
Why was the Black Death followed by the decline of serfdom in Western Europe but its’ intensification in Eastern Europe? What explains why involvement in Atlantic trade in the Early Modern period was positively correlated with economic growth in Britain but negatively correlated in Spain?
Why did frontier expansion in the 19th Century Americas go along with economic growth in the United States and economic decline in Latin America?
Why do natural resource booms seem to stimulate growth in some countries, but lead to a ‘curse’ in others, and why does foreign aid sometimes seem to encourage, other times impede economic growth?
In this paper we argue that the response of economies to shocks or innovations in economic opportunities depends on the nature of institutions. When institutions are strong, new opportunities or windfalls can have positive effects. But when institutions are weak they can have negative effects.
We present a simple model to illustrate how comparative statics are conditional on the nature of institutions and show how this perspective helps to unify a large number of historical episodes and empirical studies.
Download: Institutional Comparative Statics, oleh James A. Robinson dan Ragnar Torvik.
Sumber: Claire Brunel, nber.org
[Indian] firms were often not aware of the existence of many modern management practices [and] … they [did not] appreciate how these could improve performance.
Management Matter!
Do differences in management practices cause differences in firm performance? Although economists typically have believed that competition will simply drive badly managed firms out of the market, co-authors Nicholas Bloom, Benn Eifert, Aprajit Mahajan, David McKenzie, and John Roberts find that that is not the case, at least in the Indian textile industry.
In Does Management Matter: Evidence from India (NBER Working Paper No. 16658), the researchers analyze the results of an experiment conducted among large multi-plant textile firms in India.
A randomly chosen set of plants received free consulting on modern management practices, while other plants in the industry did not. When the authors compare the performance of the plants that received management advice with those that did not, they find that adopting the recommended management practices had three main positive effects.
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Sumber: m.kompas.com, 20 Mei 2011.
Jakarta, Kompas – Perilaku koruptif yang ditunjukkan sejumlah elite dan kader partai politik ditengarai terjadi lantaran tingginya biaya politik. Selain meningkatkan pendidikan politik, pembenahan sistem politik juga diperlukan untuk menekan praktik korupsi oleh partai politik.
Mantan Sekretaris Jenderal Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan Pramono Anung Wibowo di Jakarta, Kamis (19/5), menyebutkan, setiap anggota parpol yang akan mencalonkan diri sebagai anggota legislatif, kepala daerah, dan kepala negara harus menyiapkan dana tak sedikit.
Hal tersebut terjadi karena pelaksanaan demokrasi masih prosedural dan cenderung liberal. ”Biaya politik tinggi itu yang menjebak banyak parpol berpikir pragmatis,” katanya.
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