Archive for the ‘Artikel’ Category

The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution

November 1st, 2013 humas No comments

By: Amy Sinden, Temple University – James E. Beasley School of Law, April 7, 2006

Solusinya ?

The central question of environmental law is “how much?” How much pollution should we emit into the air and water? How much resource exploitation should we engage in? While for other “how much” questions our society tends to rely (at least in theory) on the market, when it comes to environmental harms, the tragedy of the commons frequently causes the market to fail – that is, to get the “how much” question wrong.

According to generally accepted wisdom, there are two potential solutions to the tragedy of the commons:

  1. government regulation, or
  2. privatization.

When the U.S. environmental movement began in the 1970s, government regulation seemed the obvious choice. But in recent years, intellectual fashions have changed, and privatization has become the preferred solution. The privatization solution, however, is a myth that exists, if at all, only in a world of theory.

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Property Rights for “Sesame Street”

October 29th, 2013 humas 2 comments

Diterjemahkan secara bebas oleh rusmanik dari: Janet Beales Kaidantzis, Property Rights for “Sesame Street”

Perlu Hak Kepemilikan …

Pernahkah melihat anak-anak bertengkar memperebutkan mainan? Percekcokan seperti itu juga lumrah dalam rumah tangga Katherine Hussman Klemp. Dalam Sesame Street Parent’s Guide, dia menceritakan bagaimana dia berhasil menciptakan perdamaian delapan anak di keluarganya dengan menetapkan hak kepemilikan atas sebuah mainan.

Sebagaimana halnya ibu muda lainnya, Klemp sering membelikan anak-anaknya bermacam-macam permainan. “Awalnya aku jarang menyerahkan secara spesifik suatu jenis mainan tertentu kepada seorang anak tertentu,” katanya.

Lalu apa yang terjadi? “Setelah beberapa waktu, saya melihat dengan nyata bahwa ketidakjelasan kepemilikan sangat mudah menyebabkan pertengkaran diantara kedelapan anakku. Jika semuanya milik semua orang, maka tiap anak merasa memiliki hak untuk menggunakannya sesukanya” katanya.

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Economic Governance: The Organization of Cooperation

October 26th, 2013 humas No comments

E. Ostrom

Traditionally, economic theory has by and large been a theory of markets or, more precisely, about market prices. However, there are at least two reasons why economic science should extend beyond price theory.

First, markets do not function properly unless suitable contracts can be formulated and enforced. Hence, we need to understand the institutions that support markets. Second, considerable economic activity takes place outside of markets – within households, firms, associations, agencies, and other organizations. Hence, we need theories to explain why these entities exist and how they work.

2009 Laureates have been instrumental in establishing economic governance as a field of research. Elinor Ostrom has provided evidence on the rules and enforcement mechanisms that govern the exploitation of common pools by associations of users. Oliver Williamson has proposed a theory to clarify why some transactions take place inside firms and not in markets. Both scholars have greatly enhanced our understanding of non-market institutions.

Baca selengkapnya dari: “The Prize in Economic Sciences 2009 – Popular Information“.  Baca juga: “The Prize in Economic Sciences 2009 – Illustrated Presentation“. Nobel Media AB 2013. Web. 26 Oct 2013.

Policy Relevance of New Institutional Economics?: Assessing Efficiency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness

October 25th, 2013 humas No comments

Oleh: Eva Lieberherr (EPFL)

Policy Relevance ...

Neoclassical economic theory played a central role in the public policy shift from the monopoly paradigm with strong government intervention to the liberalization of utility sectors in the early 1980s (Groenewegen 2005; Geradin 2006; Guthrie 2006). Yet the removal of governmental interferences and the devolvement of public sector activities to private contractors has not produced consistently successful results (Williamson2000; von Weizsacker, Young et al. 2005; Schouten and Pieter van Dijk 2007).

Institutional economists argue that this lack of achievement is in part due to the reliance on neoclassical economic theory, which focused on economic coordination via the price mechanism and production efficiency while ignoring considerations such as rules, behaviors and social norms (Coase 2000; North 2000; Joskow 2008).

Their argument suggests that since lessons learned from new institutional economics (NIE) can provide valuable insights into public policy-making (specifically the process of restructuring), NIE should therefore have more clout in public policy-making (Joskow 2008). NIE is indeed gaining widespread attention in social science literature as it is becoming a more mainstream subject (Joskow 2008). Particularly with respect to liberalization of utility sectors, NIE is increasingly used to analyze modes of economic coordination (Rothenberger and Truffer 2003; Finger, Groenewegen et al. 2005).

Download: Eva Lieberherr, Policy Relevance of New Institutional Economics?: Assessing Efficiency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness

The Approach of Institutional Economics

October 23rd, 2013 humas No comments

Geoffrey M. Hodgson

TODAY, THE TERM “new institutional economics” is in widespread use and is associated with a vast literature. Clearly, the temporal adjective in the adopted title of this broad set of postwar theories and approaches has been intended to demarcate the “new institutional economics” from the “old” institutional economics of Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Wesley Mitchell.

This earlier institutionalism had actually been dominant in economics departments in American universities just after the First World War. Despite this, little detailed reference has been made by leading exponents of the “new” institutional economics to this predecessor. Two factors may help to explain this oversight. The first is that the history of economic thought is currently a much neglected subdiscipline, and there is now widespread unfamiliarity with the “old” American institutionalism, despite its favored geographic location and accessible language.

The second reason is that since its decline in America after 1930 the “old” institutionalism has been repeatedly written off, and is dismissed for failing to provide a systematic and viable approach to economic theory. It is also widely—and wrongly—believed that institutionalism was essentially anti-theoretical and descriptive.

Download: Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (1998). “The Approach of Institutional Economics,Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1), pp. 166-192 (close Bookmarks).