Posts Tagged ‘governance’

Economic Governance: The Organization of Cooperation

October 26th, 2013 humas No comments

E. Ostrom

Traditionally, economic theory has by and large been a theory of markets or, more precisely, about market prices. However, there are at least two reasons why economic science should extend beyond price theory.

First, markets do not function properly unless suitable contracts can be formulated and enforced. Hence, we need to understand the institutions that support markets. Second, considerable economic activity takes place outside of markets – within households, firms, associations, agencies, and other organizations. Hence, we need theories to explain why these entities exist and how they work.

2009 Laureates have been instrumental in establishing economic governance as a field of research. Elinor Ostrom has provided evidence on the rules and enforcement mechanisms that govern the exploitation of common pools by associations of users. Oliver Williamson has proposed a theory to clarify why some transactions take place inside firms and not in markets. Both scholars have greatly enhanced our understanding of non-market institutions.

Baca selengkapnya dari: “The Prize in Economic Sciences 2009 – Popular Information“.  Baca juga: “The Prize in Economic Sciences 2009 – Illustrated Presentation“. Nobel Media AB 2013. Web. 26 Oct 2013.

Transaction Cost Regulation

June 14th, 2011 humas No comments


This paper discusses the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation (TCR), a framework to analyze the interaction between governments and investors fundamentally, but not exclusively, in utility industries.

TCR sees regulation as the governance structure of these interactions, and thus, as in standard transaction cost economics, it places emphasis in understanding the nature of the hazards inherent to these interactions.

The emphasis on transactional hazards requires a microanalytical perspective, where performance assessment is undertaken within the realm of possible institutional alternative. In that sense, politics becomes fundamental to understanding regulation as the governance of public / private interactions.

The paper discusses two fundamental hazards and their organizational implications: governmental and third party opportunism. Both interact to make regulatory processes and outcomes more rigid, formalistic, and prone to conflict than envisioned by relational contracting.

Download: Transaction Cost Regulation, oleh Pablo T. Spiller.

“Desentralisasi” Korupsi Sampai ke Daerah

March 10th, 2011 humas 4 comments

sumber: Laporan Khusus KOMPAS.COM

Banyak pertanyaan yang muncul ketika berbicara tentang desentralisasi, otonomi daerah, dan korupsi. Jika otonomi daerah dihentikan saat ini, apakah korupsi akan terjadi atau tidak? Kemiskinan akan tetap ada atau tidak? Atau, kemiskinan semakin meningkat atau tidak? Apakah benar masyarakat sipil semakin berdaya?

Sungguh, sesuatu yang tak mudah menjawab itu semua. Namun, jika kita merunut dari pelaksanaan otonomi daerah di negeri ini, dengan titik berat di kabupaten/kota, yang dimulai tahun 1999, serasa semakin sering saja ada pejabat di daerah, termasuk anggota DPRD, yang digiring ke kejaksaan, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), atau pengadilan karena terjerat kasus korupsi.

Bahkan, selama periode Januari-Juni 2010 saja, sesuai data Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), ditemukan 176 kasus korupsi di pemerintah pusat dan daerah dengan 411 orang tersangka. Mereka bukan semuanya pejabat, memang, karena ada pula pengusaha dan masyarakat yang terjerat korupsi.

Read more…

Memperbaiki Mekanisme Kawal dan Imbang (Checks And Balances) dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Daerah

April 26th, 2010 humas 12 comments

Oleh: Wahyudi Kumorotomo

Kawal dan Imbang

Kawal dan Imbang

Demokrasi dalam proses perumusan kebijakan akan terjamin apabila mekanisme kawal dan imbang (checks and balances) diantara tokoh dan lembaga perumus kebijakan publik berjalan dengan baik.

Ada dua konsep pokok dalam mekanisme kawal dan imbang. Konsep pengawalan atau pengendalian (checks) berasal dari teori klasik tentang pemisahan kekuasaan, di mana unsur legislatif, eksekutif, dan judikatif hendaknya dipegang oleh lembaga yang terpisah satu sama lain.

Sedangkan penyeimbangan kekuasaan (balances) dimaksudkan agar masing-masing lembaga penguasa tersebut dalam proses perumusan kebijakan sehari-hari punya proporsi kewenangan yang seimbang sehingga tidak ada yang memiliki kekuasaan mutlak.

Download: Memperbaiki Mekanisme Kawal dan Imbang (Checks And Balances) dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Daerah

Nobel Prize in Economic 2009: Managing Transactions

October 13th, 2009 humas No comments

Apakah fokus perhatian utama pada Nobel Prize in Economic 2009? The 2009 Sveriges Riksbank Prize for Economic Sciences is concerned with the basic question of where best to conduct transactions; in the open market, within firms, or among self-regulating groups of individuals.

Elinor Ostrom: “for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”

Elinor OstromElinor Ostrom has made extensive studies of the management of common property by groups of common owners, contrasting that with management by state or private institutions. Perhaps surprisingly, she has found that those with a vested interest in the resources they manage are frequently better at regulating those resources than publicly-appointed management bodies would be. Her research reveals that in many, but not all, cases, allowing users to develop their own rules to regulate the use of common property results in the most efficient solution for managing those resources. For instance, her studies of the lobster fisheries off the coast of Maine in the United States show that self-imposed rules can often be better, and better-followed, than imposed ones. In short, self-governance can be successful. Her work incorporates both case studies of numerous real-life examples and laboratory experiments testing the ways people interact. The experiments reveal that people seem more willing to regulate others’ behaviour than predicted, and also that the development of efficient rules for regulation depends critically on good communication between the people involved.

Oliver Williamson: “for his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm”

Oliver WilliamsonOliver Williamson’s work deals with understanding the limits of the firm. He has extended the theories of why certain transactions can be accomplished more efficiently within firms than they would by competition between firms or individuals. In brief, his theories predict that hierarchical organizations are better places to conduct transactions, such as the sale of coal for power plants, wherever there is either significant complexity or mutual interdependence underlying the transaction. The results of his analysis have significant implications for public policy, including the regulation of competition, since what at first sight might seem an apparently imperfect market may in fact be the most efficient way of regulating a particular set of transactions. Williamson’s theories extend previous work on the limits of the firm’s efficiency, by Ronald Coase among others, to a level at which empirical testing of predictions becomes possible.

Latar belakang ilmiah anugerah Nobel Prize in Economic 2009:  Scientific Background