Posts Tagged ‘Institutions’

Menilai Kembali Konsep New Institusional Economics

October 20th, 2013 humas 2 comments

Oleh: Hermada Dekiawan ( 1 2
Mahasiswa Program Magister Sains dan Doktor FEB UGM


Oliver E. Williaomson merupakan ahli ekonomi dari University of California Berkeley yang telah mendapatkan penghargaan Nobel pada tahun 2009 atas kontribusinya dalam pengembangan ekonomi kelembagaan, khususnya atas pemikiraanya dalam pengembangan transaction cost economics.  Penghargaan Nobel tersebut menyusul Douglass C. North yang juga mendapatkan Nobel atas pengembangan ekonomi kelembagaan pda tahun 1993.

Istilah new institutional economics atau ekonomi kelembagaan baru muncul pertama kali dari Williamson pada tahun 1975. Ekonomi Kelembagaan Baru menurut Williamson (2000:595)3 diliputi oleh tiga hal mendasar, yaitu:

  1. masih banyak ketidaktahuan atau kebingungan tentang makna “institutions”,
  2. kemajuan dalam studi kelembagaan (institutions), serta
  3. perlunya menerima pluralisme sampai munculnya teori yang mempersatukan (unified theory).

Berkaitan dengan ketidaktahuan atau kebingungan arti “lembaga”, dinyatakan oleh Williamson (2008) karena kompleksnya arti atau makna kelembagaan. Read more…

Culture, Institutions and the Wealth of Nations

June 14th, 2011 humas 2 comments


We construct an endogenous growth model that includes a cultural variable along the dimension of individualism-collectivism. The model predicts that more individualism leads to more innovation because of the social rewards associated with innovation in an individualist culture. This cultural effect may offset the negative effects of bad institutions on growth.

Collectivism leads to efficiency gains relative to individualism, but these gains are static, unlike the dynamic effect of individualism on growth through innovation.

Using genetic data as instruments for culture we provide strong evidence of a causal effect of individualism on income per worker and total factor productivity as well as on innovation.

The baseline genetic markers we use are interpreted as proxies for cultural transmission but others have a direct effect on individualism and collectivism, in line with recent advances in biology and neuro-science.

The effect of culture on long-run growth remains very robust even after controlling for the effect of institutions and other factors. We also provide evidence of a two-way causal effect between culture and institutions.

Download: Culture, Institutions and the Wealth of Nations, oleh Yuriy Gorodnichenko dan Gerard Roland

Institutional Comparative Statics

June 14th, 2011 humas No comments


Why was the Black Death followed by the decline of serfdom in Western Europe but its’ intensification in Eastern Europe? What explains why involvement in Atlantic trade in the Early Modern period was positively correlated with economic growth in Britain but negatively correlated in Spain?

Why did frontier expansion in the 19th Century Americas go along with economic growth in the United States and economic decline in Latin America?

Why do natural resource booms seem to stimulate growth in some countries, but lead to a ‘curse’ in others, and why does foreign aid sometimes seem to encourage, other times impede economic growth?

In this paper we argue that the response of economies to shocks or innovations in economic opportunities depends on the nature of institutions. When institutions are strong, new opportunities or windfalls can have positive effects. But when institutions are weak they can have negative effects.

We present a simple model to illustrate how comparative statics are conditional on the nature of institutions and show how this perspective helps to unify a large number of historical episodes and empirical studies.

Download: Institutional Comparative Statics, oleh James A. Robinson dan Ragnar Torvik.

Capital and Institutions Stimulate Growth

December 3rd, 2010 humas 1 comment

“…the best single predictor of the growth of an economy remains its investment rate.”

“The four key issues for defining institutional quality are: the quality of the bureaucracy; rule of law; risk of expropriation; and repudiation of contracts by government.”

... for growth

What explains the stellar economic performance of the East Asian nations since World War ll? How critical a role did government interventions and industrial policy play? And perhaps most importantly, what policy insights can be gleaned from East Asia that might spur faster economic growth in the former East Bloc and developing nations of the world?

“Most economists would agree that there are major lessons to be drawn for other countries from East Asia’s growth experience,” begins a wide-ranging paper by NBER Research Associate Dani Rodrik. “But what these lessons are remains subject to considerable controversy.”

Read more…

Democracy, Dictators, and Growth

November 12th, 2010 humas No comments

“The economic success of postwar East Asia has been a consequence of good-for-growth dictators, not of institutions constraining them.”

good-for-growth dictators ?

The notion that democratic political institutions help foster economic growth has gained much attention in recent years.

Indeed, the relationship seems intuitive: democracy, checks on government, and strong individual property rights should create a hospitable environment for investments in human and physical capital, and growth should follow naturally.

However, in Do Institutions Cause Growth? (NBER Working Paper No. 10568), authors Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer turn this notion on its head, arguing that “economic growth and human capital accumulation cause institutional improvement, rather than the other way around.”

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